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Abstract
We analyze experimentally two sender-receiver games with conflictive preferences. In the
first game, the sender can choose to tell the truth, to lie, or to remain silent. The latter
strategy is costly and similar to an outside option. If sent, the receiver can either trust or
distrust the sender’s message. In the second game, the receiver must decide additionally
whether or not to costly punish the sender after having observed the history of the game.
We investigate the existence of two kinds of social preferences: Lie-aversion and preference
for truth-telling. In the first game, senders tell the truth more often than predicted by the
sequential equilibrium concept, they remain silent frequently, and there exists a positive
correlation between the probability of being truthful and the probability of remaining
silent. Our main experimental result for the extended game shows that those subjects
who punish the sender with a high probability after being deceived are precisely those
who send fewer but more truthful messages. We then explore two formal models of the
baseline game that can account for our experimental results. First, we fit the data to
the logit agent quantal response equilibrium; secondly, we solve for the Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibria of a stylized version of the baseline game with two types of senders. The
equilibrium predictions obtained in both cases are consistent with both preferences for
truth-telling and lie-aversion although the latter seems to be more pronounced.
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1 Introduction
Strategic information transmission games, introduced by Crawford and Sobel [7], are char-
acterized by the following structure: A sender with private information regarding a state
variable transmits a message about the actual state to the receiver who, in turn, takes a
subsequent action that is payoff-relevant to both players. The main theoretical result of
Crawford and Sobel [7] states that less information about the true state is revealed by the
sender’s message as the preferences of the sender and the receiver become less aligned.
Several laboratory experiments have analyzed individual behavior in strategic information
transmission games. In the first experimental analysis of this kind, Dickhaut et. al [8]
corroborated the main insight of Crawford and Sobel [7]. More recently, Cai and Wang [3]
have provided evidence showing that senders reveal more private information than predicted
by the most informative sequential equilibrium and explained this finding by means of the
quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey [15] and [14]) and a behavioral type
analysis (see, among others, Stahl and Wilson [19], Nagel [16], Costa-Gomes et al. [5], and
Crawford [6]). Other experimental works have further investigated the importance of moral
behavior in these settings. Gneezy [11] has shown that if preferences are conflictive (the better
the outcome fot the receiver is, the worse for the sender and vice versa), the probability of
lying is increasing in the potential gains to the sender and decreasing in the potential loss
to the receiver. Sutter [20] has established the existence of a second-order deception because
telling the truth in Gneezy’s experiment can also be regarded as a lie if the sender expects
the receiver not to trust the message. Hurkens and Kartik [12] have found that Gneezy’s data
cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects are of one of the following two behavioral types:
either an individual does not lie at all or s/he lies whenever the outcome obtained from lying is
preferred to the outcome obtained from telling the truth. Finally, Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz
[17] have shown that moral behavior plays a decisive role in explaining the reported excessive
truth-telling with respect to the standard sequential equilibrium analysis. In particular, if (a)
the sender can only choose between the messages truth and lie, (b) the receiver’s strategy set
contains only the actions trust and distrust, and (c) preferences are conflictive but the final
payoff distribution is not too unequal, senders tell the truth significantly more often than
predicted by the sequential equilibrium analysis with purely selfish players. If this baseline
game is extended by allowing the receiver to costly punish the sender once the outcome of the
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baseline game is observed, the punishment rate after the history (lie,trust) turns out to be
considerably higher then the one after the history (truth,distrust) although the implemented
payoff distributions are identical. The authors also show that those subjects who do punish
very often after the history (lie,trust) tell also the truth very often in the extended game,
whereas the rest of the subjects play equilibrium strategies on the aggregate. Since the
overall percentage of truth-telling in the baseline game is not significantly different from the
one in the extended game, there is strong evidence that the excessive truth-telling in the
original game is also linked to some kind of moral behavior.
The present work continues the analysis of social preferences in strategic information trans-
mission games along this line. One may think of two distinct types of social preferences that
can explain excessive truth-telling, preference for truth-telling and lie-aversion. According to
the first one, individuals gain some extra utility from being honest whereas the latter implies
that they loose some utility when they deceive others. Since it is impossible to distinguish be-
tween these two forms of preferences if the message spaceM of the sender isM = {truth, lie},
it is necessary to construct a new experiment in order to study which of them is prominent
and how they relate to each other. One possible way to achieve this goal is to extend our
previous analysis by introducing a third strategy for the sender: Remaining silent. By giving
subjects this option we can discriminate between the two types of moral behavior outlined
above. For example, subjects may have a strong preference for truth-telling that would make
truth a dominant strategy. Hence, senders would always send a message. Note that this would
not be any longer the case if subjects display a symmetric strong lie-aversion because then lie
becomes a dominated strategy and since telling the truth under conflictive preferences would
give the sender only a low material payoff, she would prefer to remain silent in the first place.
On the other hand, remaining silent may in our framework be due to other two reasons: First,
subjects may have a weaker preference for truth-telling and recognize that if required to send
a message they will tend to be truthful. If, additionally, receivers trust often, the sender will
get only a low material payoff and may thus prefer to remain silent. Alternatively, subjects
may be lie-averse and since material incentives favor the use of deception, remaining silent
becomes a way to avoid lying.
In our experimental analysis we consider two different games. In the Benchmark Game
the sender chooses among the actions truth, lie, and remain silent. If the sender transmits
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a message the receiver can either trust or distrust the message, if the sender remains silent
the receiver can just take a random action. Since preferences are not aligned, a rational and
self-interested sender will optimally not transmit any information. There is a large set of
strategies to achieve this but the percentage of truthful messages must be one-half in any
of them. Since remaining silent does not change the receiver’s beliefs either but comes at
a strictly positive cost c, a rational and self-interested sender would never take this action
and, therefore, all sequential equilibria of the baseline game are characterized by the fact that
the percentage of truth-telling and the percentage of lies is one-half and messages are always
sent.1 In our parametrization of the baseline game we find that the sequential equilibrium
prediction does not hold on two grounds: the percentage of truthful messages is greater than
fifty percent (it is 51.67% for c = 0.1 and 53.9% for c = 0.5 but only the latter difference is
significant) and subjects remain silent rather often (the corresponding percentages are 10.17%
for c = 0.1 and 10.25% for c = 0.5). The former result hints into the direction of a weak
preference for truth-telling whereas the latter suggests the existence of lie-aversion. Moreover,
since subjects who send more truthful messages are also more likely to remain silent, it seems
to be the case that both types of social preferences are positively correlated.
To analyze this point further we proceed in the following way. First, the Punishment
Game extends the baseline treatment by giving the receiver the option of reducing the payoff
distribution to (0,0) once he observes the potential outcome of the baseline game. A ratio-
nal and self-interested receiver would never reduce payoffs and, consequently, the standard
sequential equilibrium prediction with respect to the percentage of truth-telling and the per-
centage of lies is the same as in the baseline game. We find however that the punishment rate
after history (lie,trust) is above 42% for both c. Note that, the payoff distribution associated
to the history (truth,distrust) is the same as the one after history (lie,trust). But since the
corresponding punishment rates are “only” equal to 18% for c = 0.1 and 4% for c = 0.5, a
lie is clearly perceived as a deception if the receiver trusts the message. Moreover, due to
the specific role rotation mechanism we implement, we are able to track down the behavior
of every subject in both roles. It turns out that those subjects who punish very often after
history (lie,trust) behave in a morally consistent way; that is, they are responsible for the
1In order to avoid misunderstandings we explain the terminology percentage of truthful messages and per-
centage of truth-telling. The former is the probability of telling the truth conditional on a message being sent
whereas the latter refers to the unconditional probability.
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excessive truth-telling and remain silent more often. In fact, they tell the truth in 87.65%
(76.59%) of the occasions for c = 0.1 (c = 0.5) whereas the remaining subjects do so in only
52.08% (51.41%) of all occasions. Similarly, the morally consistent individuals remain silent
in 30.83% (33.25%) of all observations for c = 0.1 (c = 0.5), but the remaining group of
individuals does so only in 16.53% (13.25%) of all occasions. Moreover, they trust a 25These
results corroborate the central role of social preferences in the Punishment Game.
In a second step, we formulate the logit agent quantal response equilibrium of McKelvey
and Palfrey [15] for the Benchmark Game when individuals have social preferences. We
introduce into the utility specification of the sender one parameter that measures preference
for truth-telling and one parameter that measures the degree of lie-aversion. The receiver on
the other hand is supposed to face a utility loss whenever he gets the lower payoff, after history
(truth,distrust) because he is inequity averse and after (lie,trust) because he feels deceived. If
we now take the punishment rates after these histories as estimates for the utility loss faced
by the receiver and fit the data of the Benchmark Game to the equilibrium predictions, it
is possible to determine the two parameters of social preferences uniquely. We obtain that
truth-telling enhances the senders payoff by roughly 4% for c = 0.1 and 12% for c = 0.5. On
the other, lying decreases the payoff around 10% for both c. Hence, the data of the Benchmark
Game is consistent with both types of social preferences in this indirect equilibrium approach,
although lie-aversion seems to be slightly more prominent.
One drawback of the former quantification is that we have to consider aggregate data.
But individual behavior is diverse and, therefore, it is necessary to explain the structural
features of our data by means of a theoretical model with different types of players. We
consider a stylized version of the Benchmark Game in which remaining silent becomes an
outside option. Moreover, the sender is assumed to have either a high or a low cost of lying
and the receiver prefers the history (truth,distrust) over (lie,trust). For the parameter values
of interest, there is one pooling and one separating Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The
percentages of truthful and trusted messages are greater than fifty percent in both equilibria,
the difference is that the sender with a high cost of lying tells always the truth in the pooling
equilibrium whereas she remains silent in the separating equilibrium. This prediction can
therefore account for the positive correlation between the percentage of truthful messages
and the probability of remaining silent simply because subjects may coordinate sometimes on
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the pooling and sometimes on the separating equilibrium.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we introduce the games formally and de-
scribe our experimental design and procedures. Afterwards, we present the results of the
experiments. In Section 4, we perform the theoretical analysis. Finally, we conclude. Com-
plementary material (proofs, the instructions corresponding to the Punishment Game, and a
description of the computer programs and the raw data) is relegated to the Appendix.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
In this section, we introduce the two games we compare experimentally and provide a detailed
overview of the experimental procedures. We start with the baseline treatment.
The Benchmark Game
Let P = {sender,receiver} be the set of players. At the beginning of the game, the payoff
tables A and B are selected randomly with equal probability, i.e. p(A) = p(B) = 0.5, and only
the sender is informed about the payoff table actually chosen. Selecting table θ ∈ Θ = {A,B}
means that final payoffs are realized according to θ. Both tables depend only on the action
U or D taken by the receiver later on.
Table A Sender Receiver
Action U 5 1
Action D 1 5
Table B Sender Receiver
Action U 1 5
Action D 5 1
Table 1: Payoff Tables
After the sender has been informed, she chooses a mixed strategy with support on her
action space M = {A,B,N}. That is, if table θ is actually selected, the sender communicates
with probability p(m|θ), m ∈ Θ, that table m determines payoffs and with probability p(N |θ)
she remains silent and pays the strictly positive cost c. If the sender takes action m ∈ M ,
the receiver believes with probability µ(θ|m) that the actual payoff scheme is represented by
table θ. Taking into account these beliefs, the receiver chooses a mixed strategy with support
on her action set A = {U,D}. Formally, given m ∈ M , the receiver takes action a ∈ A with
probability q(a|m). Finally, both players receive their payoff. We denote by xs(a,m, θ) and
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xr(a,m, θ) the payoffs of the sender and the receiver when the receiver takes action a upon
message m and the true state is θ.
In the Benchmark Game, the sender chooses a mixed strategy over the set of actions
telling the truth, lying, and remaining silent. In the two former cases the receiver has two
actions at hand: He can trust the message (i.e., take action D upon message A and action U
upon message B) or he can distrust it (i.e., take action U upon message A and action D upon
message B).2 If the sender remains silent, the receiver has to randomize between U and D.3
Self-interested and fully rational senders will never remain silent in the Benchmark Game.
This is because any strategy in which the sender tells the truth as often as she lies leaves the
receiver’s prior beliefs about the underlying payoff table unchanged, which is optimal given
that preferences are opposed. Since remaining silent does not change prior beliefs either
but comes at a strictly positive cost, the sender will never remain silent and the optimal
percentages of truth-telling and lying must both be equal to fifty percent. A self-interested
and fully rational receiver will foresee this and trust the sender with probability one-half.
Remark 1: The set of sequential equilibria of the Benchmark Game is such that the sender
tells the truth and lies with probability one-half each and the receiver trusts the sender’s
message with probability one-half.
To analyze the effect the cost c has on the propensity to remain silent we conducted
two experimental series, one with c = 0.1 and one with c = 0.5. The results of these two
treatments are compared to the ones of an extended game in which the receiver can punish
the sender at a strictly positive cost once he observes the outcome of the original game.
The Punishment Game
The Punishment Game extends the Benchmark Game. Let H be the set of all histories of
the Benchmark Game. After observing a particular history h = h(a,m, θ) ∈ H, the receiver
reduces the payoffs of both participants to zero with probability r(h) ∈ [0, 1] and he accepts
2Here we assume implicitly that the receivers trust (distrust) can be equated with receivers believing the
payoff table to be the one (opposite) of the sender’s message and playing a best response to this belief. We
controlled for this assumption in our earlier paper (see [17]) by asking explicitly the receiver’s beliefs before
taking an action.
3Theoretically it is possible that remaining silent conveys information with respect to the payoff table. But
this is not the case because A was the underlying payoff table in 48% of all cases when the sender remained
silent and with probability 0.515 the receiver chose action U afterwards.
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the payoff distribution induced by the Benchmark Game with probability 1 − r(h). Then,
both players receive their payoff.
It is straightforward to determine the set of sequential equilibria of the Punishment Game
because a self-interested and fully rational receiver would never punish the sender.
Remark 2: The set of sequential equilibria of the Punishment Game is such that the receiver
does never punish the sender, the sender tells the truth and lies with probability one-half each,
and the receiver trusts the sender’s message with probability one-half.
We conducted our experiments at Maastricht University in May and June 2006. Students
from the economics and business faculty were able to register online using their matriculation
number. By doing this we ensured that every student participated in only one session. In
total 240 undergraduate students took part in the experiment. We organized a total of 20
sessions, for both cost factors we had five sessions on the Benchmark and the Punishment
Game. Twelve subjects participated in every experimental session.
To perform the experiment we employed the computer software Z-Tree developed by
Fischbacher [10]. At the beginning of a session, students met outside the laboratory. We
prepared cards with the numbers from one to twelve and let each student draw one card.
If more than twelve students showed up for a particular session, we offered three Euros in
case somebody was willing to register for a different session. If an insufficient number of
students decided to leave, we put additional empty cards into the deck and determined the
participating students randomly. Left-out students received also a compensation of three
Euros. We also reminded everybody that any kind of communication inside the laboratory
would lead to an immediate cancellation of the session. Afterwards, students entered the
laboratory and took seat in front of the computer with the number corresponding to their
card. The computers were placed in such a way that subjects could not see each other and we
put next to each computer an envelope containing the instructions and an official payment
receipt (see the Appendix for the instructions corresponding to the Punishment Game).
Before the first round of a session, the computer randomly divided subjects into groups
of six without revealing the actual matching. Thus, the students, who were all anonymous
to each other, did not know who else was in their group. We informed every subject that
s/he would only play against subjects belonging to the same group. So we implicitly divided
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our subject pool into a total of 40 groups of six subjects, ten groups playing each of the four
treatments. In each of the fifty rounds of an experimental session the computer matched
the subjects belonging to the same group into three new pairs and assigned different roles
(sender or receiver) within pairs. The matchings were balanced so that after fifty rounds every
subject played the game exactly ten times against each of her/his five opponents. Moreover,
every subject met every opponent five times in each role. The pre-determined order of the
matchings was unknown to the subjects. Thus, dynamic strategies should not matter.
In every round, after pairs had been formed and roles had been assigned, the sender was
informed of whether table A or B had been selected. Then, the sender chose an action from
the set M = {A,B,N} telling the receiver which table corresponds to the actual payoff table
or remaining silent at cost c. Afterwards, the receiver took either action U or action D. This
constituted the end of the round in the Benchmark Game. In the sessions corresponding to
the Punishment Game, the receiver was further informed about the induced payoffs of her/his
action. Finally, s/he had to decide between accepting these payoffs or reducing the payoff of
both participants to zero.
At the end of a session, we called subjects one by one to step forward to the control desk
for payment. Subjects received 6.7 cents per point in the payoff table. As a result, for c = 0.1
(c = 0.5) the average payment in the one hour session corresponding to the Benchmark and
the Punishment Game was equal to 10.1 (9.9) Euros and 8.6 (8.5) Euros, respectively.
3 Results
We describe in this section the results of our experiments. Before we do so, one comment
regarding our statistical analysis is worth mentioning. First, we only consider data from the
last forty rounds in order to account for possible learning effects. We calculate then the
percentages of the variables of interest (i.e., truthful messages and trust) for all groups. In
this way, we obtain ten independent observations for each of the four treatments. Then, we
perform Wilcoxon signed rank and Mann-Whitney U tests on these observations.
3.1 The Benchmark Game
The first descriptive analysis regards the behavior of the senders in the Benchmark Game. We
investigate the existence of social preferences by looking both at the percentage of truthful
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messages and the frequency of silence. The relevant information is graphically presented in
the four panels of Figure 1. The top row corresponds to the case c = 0.1 the bottom one
to c = 0.5. In the panels to the right we present for all rounds the percentage of truthful
messages and the percentage with which subjects remain silent. The latter percentage belongs
always to the lower of the two lines in a given graph. The scatterplots on the left hand side
show the strategy of every subject and include an OLS regression on the percentage with
which a subject remains silent using a constant and the percentage of truthful messages as
regressors.
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Figure 1: Senders’ Behavior (Benchmark Game)
In the top right panel of Figure 1 it can be seen that the percentage of truthful messages
per round oscillates around the equilibrium prediction for c = 0.1 with some more values above
fifty percent than below. The percentage with which the senders remain silent lies around
10% in nearly all rounds. The data looks quite similar for c = 0.5 only there seem to be less
cases when the percentage of truthful messages is below fifty percent. The overall percentage
of truthful messages is 51.67% for c = 0.1 and 53.9% for c = 0.5. According to our first
null hypothesis, which follows from the sequential equilibrium predictions, the percentage of
truthful messages should be equal to fifty percent. The corresponding alternative hypothesis
states that social preferences are prevalent and therefore the percentage of truthful messages
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will be strictly greater than fifty percent. We obtain that the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected for c = 0.1 although the median observation is 52.85% (the one-sided p-value of the
Wilcoxon signed rank test is 0.2377) but it can be rejected for c = 0.5 (the one-sided p-value
of the Wilcoxon signed rank test is 0.0095). The median observation is 53.15% in the latter
case. Moreover, the medians are not significantly different from each other (the two-sided
p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test is 0.8798).4
Result 1: In the Benchmark Game, the percentage of truthful messages is greater than fifty
percent for both c but the difference is only significant for c = 0.5. Moreover, the percentage
of truthful messages for c = 0.5 is not significantly different from the one for c = 0.1.
The strategies of every subject can be found in the two left panels of Figure 1. On average
a subject remains silent with probability 0.1017 when c = 0.1 and with probability 0.1025
when c = 0.5, but we also see also that a lot of subjects never followed that strategy. We
obtain from a simple OLS regression that subjects who tell the truth more often are also more
likely to remain silent. The estimated slopes for c = 0.1 and c = 0.5 are equal to 0.1532 and
0.1913, respectively, with the intercept not being significant at the five percent significance
level in either regression.5 Since the estimated equations are very similar to each other and
the overall percentages are also very close, we deduce that subjects remain silent equally often
across the two specifications. This intuition is confirmed by the statistical analysis, because
the two-sided p-value of the corresponding Mann-Whitney U test is 0.7613. Note that the
median observation is 5% for c = 0.1 and 9.2% for c = 0.5.
Result 2: In the Benchmark Game, the probability of remaining silent is significantly greater
than zero for both c but not significantly different from each other. Moreover, those subjects
who send more truthful messages are more likely to remain silent.
Now we analyze the receivers behavior. In the four panels of Figure 2 we present a
4In our earlier paper (see [17]) where the sender could only choose among the strategies truth and lie, we
obtained that the percentage of truthful messages was significantly greater than fifty percent if the implemented
payoff distribution was either (1,2) or (2,1) but not if it was either (9,1) or (1,9). Our findings here seem to be
consistent with our former results since the present specification can be thought off as an intermediate case.
5One word of caution with respect to the OLS regressions. The more often an individual remains silent the
fewer observations we can have with respect to her/his honesty. This can become a major problem if a lot
of subjects decide to remain silent very often. But this is not the case as in total only three subjects remain
silent in more than sixty percent. Moreover, we can obtain a similar result by dividing the subject pool into
two groups: In one group we put all subjects that remain silent at least once and in the other group the rest
of the subjects. The probability that a given message is true for the former group is 0.6364 for c = 0.1 and
0.5903 for c = 0.5. The corresponding probabilities for the rest of the subjects are only 0.4536 and 0.4975.
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histogram of the percentage of messages trusted (the two panels on the left hand side) and
show how this percentage evolves over rounds (the two panels on the right hand side). We
see that the level of trust lies above fifty percent in nearly all rounds, independently of the
value of c, reaching sometimes even considerably high values. The empirical distribution is
rather uniform for c = 0.1 and seems to be closer to the normal for c = 0.5. Moreover,
there are considerably more subjects who trust with a probability greater than 0.5 in both
distributions. The overall percentage of trust is 55.25% for c = 0.1 and 56.60% for c = 0.5.
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Figure 2: Receivers’ Behavior (Benchmark Game)
In our statistical analysis we check whether the receivers adjust their behavior in response
to the senders strategies in the correct direction by testing the null hypothesis that the
receivers trust with probability 0.5 against the alternative hypothesis that this probability is
greater than 0.5. The median observation is 52.7% for c = 0.1 and 57.8% for c = 0.5. We
obtain by means of a one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test that the difference is in both cases
significant, the corresponding one-sided p-values are 0.0050 for c = 0.1 and 0.0072 for c = 0.5.
Additionally, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the percentage of trust for c = 0.1 is the
same as the one for c = 0.5 (the two-sided p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test is 0.7913).
Result 3: In the Benchmark Game, the percentage of messages trusted is significantly greater
than fifty percent for both c and the two values are not significantly different from each other.
We sum up our findings for the Benchmark Game. Since the percentage of truthful
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messages is slightly above fifty percent in the Benchmark Game, we have found evidence in
favor of weak preferences for truth-telling. Moreover, the receivers seem to predict the senders
behavior correctly because they trust more often than they distrust. Finally, the fact that
the percentage with which subjects remain silent is considerably bounded away from zero but
smaller than one hints in the direction of a weak form of lie-aversion. The OLS regression
revealed additionally that the two types of social preferences seem to be positively correlated.
None of these results depends on the value of c.
3.2 The Punishment Game
From the previous analysis, it is evident that the observed excessive truth-telling and the
considerable frequency of silence are likely to be driven by social preferences. But of what
type? In this section, we investigate this point further with the help of the Punishment Game.
In particular, we are going to identify a fraction of subjects who behave morally in the role of
the receiver and show that they behave in a consistent way; that is, as senders they tell the
truth very often and remain silent frequently.
Models of inequity aversion such as the ones of Fehr and Schmidt [9] and Bolton and
Ockenfels [1] incorporate experimental evidence showing that individuals take into account
in the evaluation of an outcome not only their own payoff but also the payoff of others.
But preferences may even be more complex because, as it has been suggested by Sen [18],
individuals may also care about how a particular payoff distribution has been reached; that
is, they may have concerns for procedural justice. The experimental findings of Brandts and
Charness [2] and Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz [17] support this conjecture.
c=0.1 Trust Distrust
Truth 0 0.1795
Lie 0.4658 0
c=0.5 Trust Distrust
Truth 0.0025 0.0398
Lie 0.4239 0
Figure 3: Punishment Behavior
Figure 3 provides further evidence in favor of the notion of procedural justice. First we see
that the punishment rates after the histories (truth,trust) and (lie,distrust) are virtually zero.
This is explained by the fact that these histories are the most favorable ones to the receiver.
Since the potential payoff distribution after the histories (lie,trust) and (truth,distrust) is
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(5,1), a sufficient inequity averse receiver may prefer the payoff distribution (0,0) instead,
and consequently punish the sender. However, according to the models of inequity aversion
the punishment rate should be the same after both histories. This is clearly not the case
and the extra punishments after the history (lie,trust), 28.63% for c = 0.1 and 38.41% for
c = 0.5, should be attributed to the deceit the sender commits. On the contrary, in the
history (truth,distrust) the sender conforms to social norms and ultimately it is the receiver’s
fault why he gets the lower payoff. In case the sender remains silent the punishment rates are
10.49% (6.19%) for c = 0.1 (c = 0.5) if the receiver gets the lower payoff and zero for both
c if the receiver gets the higher payoff. Since these values compare to the punishment rates
after history (truth,distrust) in Figure 3, we refer from now on to the punishment rate after
this history as the baseline utility loss induced by inequity aversion.
Result 4: Procedural justice matters. The punishment rate after the history (lie,trust) is
significantly higher than the one after history (truth,distrust).
Result 4 will be important in the next section where we quantify social preferences for
the Benchmark Game but it should also have crucial consequences in the Punishment Game
itself. This is because the senders’ incentive structure changes to some extent. A subject
who aims uniquely at maximizing her/his payoff should always lie and always trust in the
Benchmark Game but a purely self-interested sender should now avoid to lie because the risk
of being punished and ending up with nothing is too high. This is similar to what happens
in ultimatum games, where substantial offers can be explained as responses to the threat of
rejection. Here, the alternatives are either to tell the truth or to remain silent. The former
strategy bears a big risk of being easily outguessed by the receiver which results in a low
payoff. By remaining silent the sender incurs into a cost but since the associated punishment
rates are rather small, this strategy looks far more promising. On the basis of our data it
yields in fact the highest expected payoff, i.e. 2.64 (2.36) for c = 0.1 (c = 0.5) versus 1.73
(2.07) from telling the truth and 2.28 (2.35) from lying.
Now, we turn our attention to the behavior of the sender. It can be seen in the top right
panel of Figure 4 that the percentage of truthful messages for c = 0.1 is in almost all rounds
greater than fifty percent, leading to an overall percentage of 64.74%. We obtain by means of
a one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test that the median observation of 56.9% is significantly
greater than the equilibrium prediction of fifty percent (the corresponding one-sided p-value
14
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Figure 4: Senders’ Behavior (Punishment Game)
is 0.0499). In the lower right panel, where we plot the senders’ behavior over rounds for
c = 0.5, it can be observed that the percentage of truthful messages is very high for a lot
of rounds, specially for the first twenty. But the overall percentage of truthful messages is
“only” 56.53% because there are also quite a few rounds where the percentage is low. The
one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test reveals nevertheless that the median observation of 54.5%
is significantly greater than fifty percent (the corresponding one-sided p-value is = 0.0329).
Moreover, there is no difference in the percentage of truthful messages across the two costs
(the two-sided p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test is 0.6495).
Result 5: In the Punishment Game, the percentage of truthful messages is significantly
greater than fifty percent for both c and the percentage of truthful messages for c = 0.1 is not
significantly different from the one for c = 0.5.
The two right panels of Figure 4 reveal also that the percentage with which subjects
remain silent increases slightly during the course of the sessions for c = 0.1 whereas it stays
rather constant, at a high level though, for c = 0.5. This is consistent with our earlier finding
that this action yields the highest payoff. The overall percentage of silence in the last forty
rounds of the experiment is equal to 22.33% for c = 0.1 and 18.33% for c = 0.5 whereas the
median observations, 12.50% for c = 0.1 and 16.65% for c = 0.5, are somewhat lower. The
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difference between these two values is not significant at any conventional confidence level (the
two-sided p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test is 0.8797). In the two left panels we see that
individual behavior is very volatile, the only pattern that can perhaps be identified is that a
lot of subjects do always transmit a message. This idea is supported by the OLS regression
because the percentage of truthful messages is no longer significant as an explanatory variable
in either case. The estimated constant is 0.1767 for c = 0.1 and 0.1853 for c = 0.5.6
Result 6: In the Punishment Game, the probability of remaining silent for c = 0.1 is not
significantly different from the one for c = 0.5 but higher than in the Benchmark Game. The
probability of remaining silent is also independent of the percentage of truthful messages.
Our final descriptive analysis in this section regards the receivers’ behavior in the Pun-
ishment Game. The power the receivers have due to their punishment opportunity and the
importance of procedural justice according to Result 4 made the senders tell the truth often.
The best response for the receivers would thus be to always trust the senders’ messages. We
see in the two left panels of Figure 5 that a lot of subjects trust almost always and that only a
few trust less than the equilibrium prediction of 0.5. This leads to a very skewed distribution.
In the two right panels of the same figure we observe additionally that the percentage of trust
is in all rounds far higher than the equilibrium prediction.
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Figure 5: Receivers’ Behavior (Punishment Game)
6Seven subjects remained always silent in the Punishment Game. Since their behavior cannot be represented
in the left panels of Figure 4, we excluded them also from the statistical analysis.
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The results of the statistical analysis are therefore straightforward. The overall percentage
of trust in the Punishment Game is 76.84% for c = 0.1 and 71.98% for c = 0.5. The median
observations are 76.5% for c = 0.1 and 70.35% for c = 0.5. The latter two values are obviously
significantly greater than the equilibrium prediction (the one-sided p-value of the Wilcoxon
signed rank test is in both case 0.0030) but not significantly different from each other (the
two-sided p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test is 0.7337).
Result 7: In the Punishment Game, the percentage of messages trusted is significantly greater
than fifty percent for both c and the two values are not significantly different from each other.
To sum up our findings for the Punishment Game so far. Most importantly, we have es-
tablished the central role of procedural justice by showing that the punishment rates after the
histories (truth,distrust) and (lie,trust) are very distinct from each other. This result does not
only contradict the standard sequential equilibrium hypothesis but also more general models
of inequity aversion. Moreover, we have found that the percentage of silence is independent
of the percentage of truthful messages at the individual level. This result comes up in sharp
contrast to the one obtained in the Benchmark Game. The reason for this is that since re-
maining silent avoids the potential receivers’ outrage when they are deceived, some senders
who would have lied in the Benchmark Game may now prefer to abstain from sending any
message. As we will see next, these subjects do not display substantial moral concerns and
this makes the correlation vanish. Finally, note that the results are again very robust with
respect to the cost factor c.
3.3 The Separability Hypothesis
So far we have evidenced that moral considerations enter into the subjects decisions when
they have to decide whether or not to punish the sender. We perform now a final consistency
test to show that social preferences are also important when subjects act in the role of the
sender. Thanks to the role rotation mechanism all subjects play the Punishment Game
equally often in both roles. If we now divide the whole subject pool into two groups, one
group containing those subjects who punish the senders frequently after history (lie,trust)
and one group consisting of the rest of the subjects, is it true that those subjects who care
about procedural justice as a receiver send less frequent but more truthful messages? In other
words, is this moral behavior consistent across roles?
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Since the punishment rate after history (lie,trust) lies between forty and fifty percent
for both c, we classify all subjects that punish the sender after this history in more than
eighty percent of all occasions as the ones with real concerns for procedural justice.7 This
criterium is met by 23 out of 60 subjects for c = 0.1 and by 17 subjects for c = 0.5. In the
former (latter) case, these subjects send a truthful message with probability 0.8765 (0.7659)
and remain silent with probability 0.3083 (0.3355). The corresponding probabilities for the
remaining subjects are 0.5208 (0.5141) and 0.1653 (0.1324) for c = 0.1 (c = 0.5), respectively.
Moreover, the morally consistent subjects also trust around 25% more than the others and
receive a roughly 10% lower material payoff.8
We can conclude from this result that moral concerns are also crucial in understanding the
senders’ behavior in the Punishment Game because if all individuals that punish the sender a
lot after history (lie,trust) are taken away from the subject pool, the observed excessive truth-
telling nearly vanishes and the percentage of remaining silent declines considerably. Moreover,
we have also re-established for the morally consistent subjects the positive correlation between
the probability of sending a truthful message and the probability of remaining silent we had
already found in the Benchmark Game.
4 Modelling and Estimating Social Preferences
In the former sections we have established two main results: First that subjects’ behavior in
the Benchmark Game is on the aggregate consistent with weak forms of both lie-aversion and
preferences for truth-telling and second, that a fraction of subjects, identified by means of the
Punishment Game, indeed display them. In the present section we will develop two formal
models that can account for these observations.
Our desiderata for these models is that they must generate a percentage of truthful and
trusted message above 50% and, at the same time, they must display a positive correlation
between truth-telling and the probability of remaining silent across subjects. In the first
7In expectation every subject plays the Punishment Game in the last forty rounds of the experiment 20
times in the role of the receiver. In this 20 repetitions the subject will play the history (lie,trust) about 6 times.
Hence, we selected in expectation those subjects who punished the sender in at least five out of six occasions.
8We come to a similar conclusion if we put into one group all subjects that never punish the sender after
history (lie,trust) and into the other group all remaining subjects. For c = 0.1 (c = 0.5) 13 (28) individuals
satisfy this criterium. The non-punishers send a truthful message with probability 0.4689 (0.4990) and remain
silent with probability 0.0731 (0.1375). The corresponding probabilities for the remaining individuals are
0.7095 (0.6285) and 0.2638 (0.2219), respectively.
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model we modify slightly the utility function for senders and receivers and then apply the
logit agent quantal response equilibrium (logit-AQRE) concept proposed by McKelvey and
Palfrey [15]. In the second model, we build on the idea of a fixed cost of lying proposed by
Gneezy [11] and formalized by Kartik [13], and solve a simplified version of the Benchmark
Game with two types of senders. The results obtained in both cases are consistent with our
desiderata and can explain the observed data as reasonably as formal models can.
4.1 Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium
Since it is impossible to extract social preferences directly from the Benchmark Game, we
apply now an indirect equilibrium approach. To do so, we suppose that the utility functions
us of the sender and ur of the receiver take the following form:
us(h) =


αT · xs if m = {truth}
αL · xs if m = {lie}
3− c if m = {remain silent}
ur(h) =


βT if h=(truth,distrust)
βL if h=(lie,trust)
xr otherwise
.
According to this specification the utility of the sender does not only depend on her payoff
xs but also on the type of message she sends. In particular, if she tells the truth her payoff
is enhanced by factor αT ≥ 1 and if she lies a loss of factor 1− αL ≥ 0 is suffered. Moreover,
if the sender remains silent, the almost fair payoff distribution (3 − c, 3) is implemented in
expectation and we assume for simplicity that the sender’s utility is in this case equal to
her payoff. On the other hand, the receiver takes into account the notion of procedural
justice which can be seen by the fact that his utility does depend on the whole history of the
Benchmark Game. Following our findings in the Punishment Game the receiver feels deceived
after history (lie,trust) and his payoff is downgraded to βL ≤ 1. The corresponding utility
associated to (truth,distrust) is βT , where 1 ≥ βT ≥ βL. This specification incorporates both
the receiver’s inequity aversion and concerns for procedural justice. Finally, we assume again
for simplicity that the receiver’s utility is equal to her payoff in all other cases.
In the next step, we define the logit agent quantal response equilibrium (logit-AQRE)
proposed McKelvey and Palfrey [15] for the given utility functions. The central idea of this
model of bounded rationality, which encompasses the sequential equilibrium concept as a
special case, is that individuals make mistakes when they try to maximize their utility but
have correct beliefs about their opponents actions. According to the logit-AQRE, which is
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parameterized by λ ∈ [0,∞), the sender transmits message m in state θ with probability
p(m|θ) = e
λus(m|θ)P
i∈M e
λus(i|θ)
, where us(i|θ) =
∑
a∈A q(a|i) · us(a,m, θ) denotes the expected utility
from sending message i in state θ. Similarly, the receiver chooses action a after observing
message m with probability q(a|m) = e
λur(a|m)P
j∈A e
λur(j|m)
. Here, ur(j|m) corresponds to the ex-
pected payoff of taking action j upon messagem; that is, ur(j|m) =
∑
θ∈Θ µ(θ|m)·ur(j,m, θ),
where µ(θ|m) = p(m|θ)P
i∈Θ p(i|θ)
is the receiver’s posterior belief about the state θ when he observes
message m. Observe that the logit-AQRE selects one sequential equilibrium for λ→∞ and
αT = αL = βT = βL = 1.
Due to the symmetry of the Benchmark Game it will be the case that p(A|A) = p(B|B),
p(B|A) = p(A|B), and q(D|A) = q(U |B); that is, the probabilities of telling the truth, lying,
and trust are independent of the selected payoff table. Hence, from now on, let pT and pL be
the probabilities that the sender tells the truth and lies, respectively. Consequently, the sender
remains silent with probability 1−pT −pL. The probability that a given message is truthful is
denoted by p¯T . Now, if qT is the probability that the receiver trusts the sender’s message, the
logit-AQRE for the Benchmark Game with cost c is fully specified by the following equations:
qT =
eλ(p¯T (5−βL)+βL)
eλ(p¯T (5−βL)+βL)+eλ(5−p¯T (5−βT ))
pT =
eλ·αT ·(5−4·qT )
eλ·αT ·(5−4·qT )+eλ·αL·(1+4·qT )+eλ(3−c)
pL =
eλ·αL·(1+4·qT )
eλ·αT ·(5−4·qT )+eλ·αL·(1+4·qT )+eλ(3−c)
. (1)
Observe that given qT , αT (5−4qT ) is the expected utility of telling the truth while αL(1+4qT )
is the expected utility from lying. Similarly, given p¯T , the receiver gets an expected utility of
p¯T (5 − βL) + βL from trusting the sender’s message and of 5 − p¯T (5 − βT ) from distrusting
it. So far, it is not possible to determine the unobservable parameters αT and αL from the
set of equations (1) because even if we use aggregate data for qT , pT , pL, and p¯T , we are still
left with five variables (αT , αL, βT , βL, and λ) and only three equations. One way solve this
problem is to set the punishment rates after the histories (lie,trust) and (truth,distrust) equal
to 1− βL and 1− βT . This is appropriate because βL and βT are then simply the empirical
payoffs of the receiver after these histories in the Punishment Game and, most importantly,
these estimates are derived from the decisions of the receivers themselves. If we rewrite the
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set of equations (1) in terms of αT , αL, and λ, we obtain that
λ =
ln
“
qT
1−qT
”
p¯T (10−βT−βL)−5+βL
, αT =
ln
“
pT
1−pT−pL
”
+λ(3−c)
λ(5−4qT )
, and αL =
ln
“
pL
1−pT−pL
”
+λ(3−c)
λ(1+4qT )
. (2)
We are now able to determine the parameters αT and αL for our data. Additionally,
we also calculate the parameter λ which must take a non-negative value by definition of the
logit-AQRE. Typically λ is taken to be a measure of rationality, because individuals play
completely random if λ = 0 and are fully rational if λ → ∞. So, higher values indicate a
more rational behavior.
Parameters c = 0.1 c = 0.5 Estimates c = 0.1 c = 0.5
qT 0.5525 0.5660 λ 176.50 2.6377
pT 0.4633 0.4833 αL 0.9060 0.9281
pL 0.4350 0.4142 αT 1.0424 1.1286
p¯T 0.5167 0.5385
βL 0.5342 0.5761
βT 0.8205 0.9602
Table 2: Estimates of Social Preferences
Our first observation is that all estimates take values in the desired range. The rationality
parameter λ is positive and αL (αT ) is smaller (bigger) than one. The value of αT suggests
that telling the truth gains the sender an extra of four percent of her payoff when c = 0.1
and twelve percent when c = 0.5. This estimation is obviously driven by the fact that the
sender tells the truth more often in the latter case. The value of αL is nearly the same in
both cases. This makes also sense given that the percentage with which the senders remain
silent was rather independent of c. Surprising is only the big difference in the values of λ,
which is easily explained. If we have a look at the first equation in the set of equations (2),
we see that λ is an increasing function in βT . But we observe in Table 2 that βT changes
considerably across cost treatments, implying that the expected payoff of distrust is higher
for c = 0.1. Since there is nearly no change in the probability of trust across cost treatments,
this is a sign of a more rational behavior when c = 0.1, so λ must increase considerably.
4.2 A Model of Lie-Aversion
Our experimental results are consistent with the idea that individual behavior is diverse, which
is for example clearly documented by our finding that only a subset of individuals remains
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silent in the Benchmark Game. We will now take the variety of individual preferences into
account and introduce different types of players into a model inspired by the one of Kartik
[13]. This approach puts the burden of the proof on the consequences of the act of lying and
is thus different from the one proposed by Charness and Dufwenberg [4] who claim that the
potential guilt generated by deception is relative to the expectations held by the party who is
lied to. In particular, we transform the Benchmark Game into a simple simultaneous move
game with an outside option for the sender; that is, we assume implicitly that a message
is decomposed into two parts: First, whether or not the sender remains silent and second,
whether or not a sent message is truthful. By doing so we can abstract from the beliefs held
by the receivers about the truthfulness of a message thereby concentrating on the behavior
of the sender and, in particular, on her propensity to remain silent.
Simplified Benchmark Game
Let P = {sender,receiver} be the set of players. In the beginning of the game, the type of
the sender is randomly determined. We assume that the sender can be either of type h or of
type l. The probability that the sender is of type h is ε, where 0 < ε < 0.5. Only the sender
is informed about her type, indexed by i. The first decision is made by the sender; she must
decide whether or not to remain silent (opt out of the game). For every type i = l, h, we write
σi1 = 0 if she remains silent and σ
i
1 = 1 otherwise. In case the sender remains silent, the utility
distribution (3− c, 3) is implemented. If the sender does not remain silent, players enter into
a second stage in which the sender of type i chooses a probability distribution over the set of
actions {truth, lie}. We denote the probability that the sender tells the truth by σi2. Similarly,
the receiver selects a probability distribution over the set of actions {trust, distrust}. The
probability that the receiver takes the action trust is denoted by φ. The actions in the second
stage are taken simultaneously and independently. Moreover, let µi = 1−µj be the posterior
belief the receiver holds about the sender’s type being i after observing the opting out decision
of the sender.
Under the fixed (or belief-independent) cost of lying, subjects get a disutility from the act
of sending a false message. In particular, we assume that a sender of type l faces a cost from
lying of kl > 0 whereas a sender of type h suffers an utility loss of kh > kl if she is not honest.
Finally, we maintain our assumption of the previous model that the utility of the receiver
decreases whenever he gets the low payoff, either because of inequity aversion or because of
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deception. In particular, we suppose that βL < βT .
trust           distrust
truth    
lie
5,1
L
ik β,5 −
Tβ,5
5,1 ik−
Sender
3,3 c−
remain silent send message
Figure 6: Simplified Benchmark Game for Type i
Consider the Simplified Benchmark Game with two types of senders. This is a sequential
move game in which the decision of whether or not to remain silent may convey information
regarding the sender’s type. Hence, both pooling and separating Perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibria can emerge. Formally, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the Simplified
Benchmark Game is a strategy profile (σl, σh, φ) together with the posterior belief µi = 1−µj
such that σi maximizes the sender’s expected utility given φ, and φ maximizes the receiver’s
expected utility given σi and µi, where the beliefs are consistent with σi via Bayes’ rule. The
PBE of the Simplified Benchmark Game are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the Simplified Benchmark Game,
(i) for kl ≤ 2c there exists a Pooling PBE in which no type remains silent (σl1 = σ
h
1 = 1),
type l tells the truth with with probability σl2 =
5−βL
10−βT−βL
− ε1−ε
5−βT
10−βT−βL
, type h tells
always the truth, and the receiver trusts with probability φ = 12 +
kl
8 .
(ii) for kl ≤ 2c ≤ kh there exists a Separating PBE in which only type l sends messages
(σl1 = 1 and σ
h
1 = 0); she tells the truth with probability σ
l
2 =
5−βL
10−βT−βL
and the receiver
trusts with probability φ = 12 +
kl
8 .
(iii) for kl ≥ 2c there exists a Pooling PBE in which both types of senders remain silent.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The percentage of truthful messages in the equilibria described in (i) and (ii) is equal to
5−βL
10−βT−βL
> 0.5. In addition, the percentage of trusted message is as well above 50%. These
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results are consistent with our desiderata. Moreover, note that if kl ≤ 2c ≤ kh, we have two
equilibria: In one h remains silent, in the other she tells the truth for sure. Hence, this case
may account also for the observed positive correlation between the percentage of truthful
messages and the probability of remaining silent, simply by considering that sometimes sub-
jects coordinated on the pooling and sometimes on the separating PBE. The pooling PBE in
(i) is also consistent with the alternative interpretation of Gneezy’s [11] results by Hurkens
and Kartik [12] who postulate the existence of two behavioral types, one who always tells the
truth and the other who tells the truth only if payoff is maximized by doing so. Proposition
1 also points in the direction of lie-aversion as the driving force behind our experimental
observations because in an alternative version in which agents get an extra utility from being
honest it would be the subjects with less intense preferences for truth-telling who either tell
the truth less frequently (in a pooling PBE) or do remain silent (in a separating PBE). Hence,
there would be a negative correlation between remaining silent and the percentage of truthful
messages.9
5 Conclusion
A fast-growing body of the economic literature has established that people have ”social pref-
erences” and hold moral standards. In the present paper, we have studied in particular the
existence of procedural concerns in the context of a strategic information transmission game
with conflictive preferences; the better the outcome for the sender is, the worse for the re-
ceiver and vice versa. In a sense, this is the most hostile scenario for the prevalence of moral
concerns since lies pay off from a purely materialistic point of view and this could lead to
them being expected and therefore ”forgiven”. We incorporated the possibility of remaining
silent with the aim of understanding the actual type(s) of moral behavior that underlie the
excessive truth-telling observed in previous experiments of this kind. In a nutshell, the results
show that people definitely care about lies and deception: They tend to be more honest and
less opportunistic than what the standard theory would predict and dislike deception enough
to forego material benefits in order to punish those who deceived them.
In the baseline version of our game, subjects tend to send more truthful messages than
9A model in which all moves are taken simultaneously cannot account for the positive correlation either.
In that case both types remain silent or both send a message, but these equilibria do not coexist for the same
range of parameters.
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predicted by the sequential equilibrium concept, and consequently trust relatively often when
they assume the role of receivers. They also remain silent rather frequently. Moreover,
there is a positive correlation between silence and truth-telling. We then use punishments
to substantiate the existence of procedural concerns in the population. Punishment rates
were substantial when the receiver obtained the lower payoff, but were even higher when that
distribution was achieved by means of deception. Both standard theory and inequity aversion
models are unable to explain this result.
We also used this treatment as a way to identify a fraction of subjects who display a
moral consistent behavior: Subjects who punish those who lie to them tell the truth more
often, remain silent more frequently, and trust more than the rest of the population, who on
average behaves according to the standard equilibrium prediction. Whereas the strategic value
of truth-telling in the presence of punishments and procedural concerns made the positive
correlation between silence and truth vanish in the overall, it remained strong within this
group.
Finally we solve two formal models that can account for the observed data. First, we
modified individual utilities to incorporate both preferences for truth-telling and lie-aversion,
together with the dislike for deception, and then fit the data with the agent quantal response
equilibrium of the baseline game. The estimates obtained were consistent with our intuitions.
Secondly, we solved a simplified version of the Benchmark Game in which silence becomes
an outside option and senders differ with respect to their cost of telling a lie. The Perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibria of that game can replicate the aggregate observed data and can
explain the positive correlation between truth-telling and silence.
We do not want to dismiss here the idea that the rate of lying is sensitive to the potential
gains to the party who lies and to the potential loss to the party who is lied to. In a previous
paper, we ourselves found evidence of this phenomenon by changing the distribution of payoffs
in two different treatments similar to the one presented here. But it seems also unreasonable
to dismiss the existence of two types of subjects who, let us emphasize this, do not differ on
their thrust for utility maximization, but rather on the intensity of their moral concerns. We
do not want to dismiss either other operationalizations of the concept of lie-aversion; namely
Charness and Dufwenberg’s [4] based on expectations. Indeed, it is possible to modify the
game in section 4.2 to incorporate that notion. However, the results obtained in that case
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cannot account for the observed data since in our experimental design the receiver may also
suffer a let down when she is told the truth but she distrusts. Certainly, consequences and
expectations do matter, but actions also carry moral ”labels” that cannot be ignored. A lie
is always a lie. Still, our experiment is not directly designed to test these distinct theories so
we choose not to elaborate on this point any further.
The fact that at least a part of the population holds moral concerns in terms of preferences
for truth-telling and, more importantly, in terms of lie-aversion, has clear implications for
contract theory and mechanism design. The latter for instance assumes that people will lie
as long us material incentives to do so exist. Incentive-compatibility must be fulfilled. This
self-imposed assumptions on individual behavior render difficult and sometimes impossible to
find mechanisms that succeed in the task of eliciting truthfully agents’ private information.
Without them, the set of mechanism capable of this would certainly enlarge.
References
[1] G. Bolton and A. Ockenfels, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition,
American Economic Review 90 (2000), 166–193.
[2] J. Brandts and G. Charness, Truth or Consequence: An Experiment, Management Sci-
ence 49 (2003), 116–130.
[3] H. Cai and J. Wang, Overcommunication in Strategic Information Transmission, Games
and Economic Behavior 56 (2006), 7–36.
[4] G. Charness and M. Dufwenberg, Promises and Partnership, Econometrica 74 (2006),
1579–1601.
[5] M. Costa-Gomes, V. Crawford, and B. Broseta, Cognition and Behavior in Normal Form
Games: An Experimental Study, Econometrica 69 (2001), 1193–1235.
[6] V. Crawford, Lying for Strategic Advantages: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrep-
resentations of Intentions, American Economic Review 93 (2003), 133–149.
[7] V. Crawford and J. Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission, Econometrica 50 (1982),
1431–1451.
26
[8] J. Dickhaut, K. McCabe, and A. Mukherji, An Experimental Study of Strategic Infor-
mation Transmission, Economic Theory 6 (1995), 389–403.
[9] E. Fehr and K. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, Quaterly
Journal of Economics 114 (1999), 817–864.
[10] U. Fischbacher, Z-Tree - Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments - Exper-
imenter’s Manual, Working Paper Nr. 21, Institute of Empirical Research in Economics,
Zurich University (1999).
[11] U. Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences, American Economic Review 95 (2005),
384–394.
[12] S. Hurkens and N. Kartik, (When) Would I Lie to You? Comment on “Deception: The
Role of Consequences”, Mimeo (2006).
[13] N. Kartik, Information Transmission with Almost Cheap Talk, Mimeo (2005).
[14] R. McKelvey and T. Palfrey, Quantal Response Equilibria in Normal Form Games,
Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 6–38.
[15] , Quantal Response Equilibria in Extensive Form Games, Experimental Eco-
nomics 1 (1998), 9–41.
[16] R. Nagel, Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study, American Economic
Review 85 (1995), 1313–1326.
[17] S. Sa´nchez-Page´s and M. Vorsatz, An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-
Receiver Game, forthcoming Games and Economic Behavior.
[18] A. Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, Econometrica 65 (1997), 745–779.
[19] D. Stahl and P. Wilson, On Player’s Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental
Evidence, Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 218–245.
[20] M. Sutter, Deception: The Role of Expectations. A Comment on Gneezy (2005), Mimeo
(2006).
27
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider first the possibility of a separating PBE in which type i sends a message (σi1 = 1)
but type j remains silent (σj1 = 0). Hence, µ
i = 1−µj = 1. In that case, the game the sender
i and the receiver play is represented by the matrix in Figure 6. If ki ≥ 4, truth becomes a
dominant strategy and the only Nash equilibrium is (truth,trust). The utility of the sender
is thus 1. Otherwise, there exists a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies where the sender
tells the truth with probability σi2 =
5−βL
10−βT−βL
and receivers trust the sender’s message with
probability φ = 12 +
ki
8 . The sender’s expected utility is then 3−
ki
2 .
Suppose that the l type is the one who remains silent whereas the h type does not. Then,
the sender gets in expectation either 1 if kl > 4 and 3− k
h
2 otherwise. In this equilibrium the l
type gets 3− c. This cannot be an equilibrium whenever kh ≤ 2c since h will prefer to mimic.
On the other hand, l will prefer to mimic if 2c > kl. Hence, for this to be an equilibrium it
must be that kh ≤ 2c ≤ kl, which is a contradiction.
Suppose on the contrary that we are in a separating equilibrium in which the low type
sends a message and the high type does not. The low type will do that as long as kl ≤ 2c.
On the other hand, the high type will not feel tempted to mimic as long as kh ≥ 2c. Hence,
such separating equilibrium can be supported if and only kl ≤ 2c ≤ kh.
Let us now discuss the existence of a pooling PBE in which both types of senders send a
message (σl1 = σ
h
1 = 1). In that case, the simultaneous move game played at the second stage
can be represented by the following matrix:
trust distrust
truth, truth 1, 5 5, βT
truth, lie 1 + 4ε− εkh, 5− (5− βL)ε 5− 4ε− εk
h, βT + (5− βT )ε
lie, truth 5− 4ε− (1− ε)kl, βL + (5− βL)ε 1 + 4ε− (1− ε)k
l, 5− (5− βT )ε
lie, lie 5− (1− ε)kl − εkh, βL 1− (1− ε)k
l − εkh, 5
In this matrix, the first action corresponds to a sender of type l and the second one to the
type h sender. As it will become clear below two strategies at most will be played.
The receiver’s best response to both (lie,truth) and (lie,lie) is distrust whereas it is trust
to strategy (truth,truth). The best response to (truth,lie) depends upon the proportion of h
type: It is distrust if and only if ε > 5−βT10−βL−βT .
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On the other hand, only the strategy (truth,truth) can be dominant, and this happens
when kl ≥ 4. But in this case, the final utility of the sender is just 1. By deviating and
remaining silent, the sender can get 3− c. So such pooling PBE cannot exist. When kl < 4
the best response to distrust keeps being (truth,truth) but it is straightforward to show that
the best response to trust is either (lie,truth) or (lie,lie). It is the former if and only if kh ≥ 4.
In any case, this implies that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies of this simultaneous
game if kl < 4. Hence, we have to turn our attention towards the existence of mixed strategy
equilibria.
Let us now compare each possible pair of strategies and find the probability φ with which
the receiver must trust in order to support them as part of such equilibria.
(a) Suppose that two strategies played are (truth,truth) and (truth,lie). It must be that
kh ≤ 4. The receiver would always play trust if ε < 5−βT10−βL−βT and such equilibrium
could not exist since the sender would then only play (truth,lie). If ε > 5−βT10−βL−βT , φmust
be such that φ+5(1−φ) = φ(1+4ε−εkh)+(1−φ)(5−4ε−εkh) which is equivalent to
φ = 12+
kh
8 . This yields an expected utility of 3−
kh
2 for the sender. But observe that the
expected utility from playing (lie,lie) is 1+4φ−(1−ε)kl−εkh = 3+ k
h
2 −(1−ε)k
l−εkh.
Since the latter is always higher than the former, there is no equilibrium in which only
these two strategies are played.
(b) Suppose that the two strategies played are (truth,truth) and (lie,truth). The probability
of playing trust must satisfy the equation φ + 5(1 − φ) = φ(5 − 4ε − (1 − ε)kl) + (1 −
φ)(1 + 4ε − (1 − ε)kl), which is equivalent to φ = 12 +
kl
8 . So, the expected utility
of the sender is 3 − k
l
2 . We have compare it with the expected utility from the other
two strategies: For strategy (truth,lie) it is φ(1 + 4ε − εkh) + (1 − φ)(5 − 4ε − εkh) =
3 − εkh − k
l
2 (1 − 2ε), which is always smaller than 3 −
kl
2 . The expected utiltiy from
(lie,lie) is 1+4φ− (1−ε)kl−εkh = 3+ k
l
2 − (1−ε)k
l−εkh, which is also always smaller
than 3− k
l
2 .
Hence, we have to find the probabilities assigned to the strategies (truth,truth) and
(lie,truth). In a mixed strategy equilibrium it must be the case that 5σTT + (βL + (5−
βL)ε)(1−σTT ) = βTσTT+(5−(5−βT )ε)(1−σTT ), where σTT is the probability assigned
to the strategy (truth,truth). This equation solves for σTT =
5−βL
10−βT−βL
− ε1−ε
5−βT
10−βT−βL
.
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The resulting expected utility for the sender is 3− k
l
2 . Hence, if k
l ≤ 2c this pooling PBE
can be supported. Otherwise, the sender would prefer to deviate and remain silent.
(c) Suppose that the two strategies played are (truth,truth) and (lie,lie). The probability
of playing trust must be such that φ + 5(1 − φ) = φ(5 − (1 − ε)kl − εkh) + (1 −
(1 − ε)kl − εkh)(1 − φ) which is equivalent to φ = 12 +
(1−ε)kl+εkh
8 . The resulting
expected utility for the sender is 3 − (1−ε)k
l+εkh
2 . Again we have to compare this with
the payoffs from the other two strategies: The expected utility from playing (lie,truth)
is 3− (1−ε)kl+ (1−ε)k
l+εkh
2 (1−2ε). Since the latter is never smaller, there is no pooling
PBE in which only these two strategies are played.
(d) Suppose that the two strategies played are (truth,lie) and (lie,truth). The probability
of playing trust must be such that φ(1+ 4ε− εkh) + (1− φ)(5− 4ε− εkh) = φ(5− 4ε−
(1− ε)kl) + (1− φ)(1 + 4ε− (1− ε)kl), which is equivalent to φ = 12 +
(1−ε)kl−εkh
8(1−2ε) . The
expected utility of the sender is then 3 − (1−ε)k
l+εkh
2 . If the strategy (truth,truth) was
played instead, the sender would insure herself an expected utility of 3 − (1−ε)k
l−εkh
2(1−2ε) .
Since the latter is always greater than the former, there is no pooling PBE in which
only these two strategies are played.
(e) Suppose that the two strategies played are (truth,lie) and (lie,lie). This cannot be an
equilibrium if ε > 5−βT10−βL−βT because in that case the receiver would always play distrust
in which case the sender would only play (truth,lie). So suppose ε < 5−βT10−βL−βT . Then
the probability of playing trust must be solve the equation φ(1+4ε− εkh)+(1−φ)(5−
4ε− εkh) = φ(5− (1− ε)kl − εkh+ (1− (1− ε)kl − εkh)(1− φ). It solves for φ = 12 −
kl
8
and in this case the expected utility to the sender is 3− k
l
2 − (1− ε)k
l− εkh. The payoff
from playing (truth,truth) is 3+ k
l
2 , and therefore, there is no equilibrium in which only
these two strategies are played.
(f) Suppose that the two strategies played are (lie,truth) and (lie,lie). Moreover, let kh ≤ 4.
In this case, the receiver would play distrust and the sender’s best response would be
to play (lie,truth) only. Hence, there cannot be an equilibrium in which the sender only
plays these two strategies.
From the previous discussion it is evident that three or four strategies will not be played in
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any mixed strategy equilibrium. Finally, consider the case of a pooling equilibrium in which
both types remain silent. In that case, the off-the-equilibrium paths are undetermined and
they can be made arbitrary. Suppose that if one of the types deviates and actually sends a
message, the receiver believes that he is of type h with probability µh. This beliefs act exactly
in the same way as ε in the analysis above. Then either the equilibrium described in (b) or
in (d) arise. Notice that these utilities are independent of beliefs. Given the possible utilities,
such pooling PBE can be supported only if kl > 2c. 
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Instructions of the Punishment Game (c = 0.5)
Welcome.
Thank you for coming. The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions
in a particular situation. If you have any questions, feel free to raise your hand and your
question will be answered so everyone can hear. From now on until the end of the session,
unauthorized communication of any nature with any other participant is prohibited. The
experiment will be conducted through computers and all interactions between you will take
place through them.
During the session you will play a game that gives you the opportunity to make money. What
you earn depends partly on your decisions and partly on the decisions of others. At the end
of the session, the amount you earned will be paid to you privately in cash.
We start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period you will be given a
description of the experiment. We are about to begin. Switch your phones off.
General Instructions.
Write down your name and your student ID number in the official receipt. You will need it to
receive your payment at the end of the session. Next, we will go over a brief tutorial. Please
interrupt at any time if you have a question.
In this session you will play a game, which is repeated for 50 rounds. Before the first round,
the computer will randomly divide the participants into two groups of six. This division will
last for the entire session. Participants within each group will play only among themselves.
The assignment process is random and anonymous so you will not know who is in your group.
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly joined with another participant from
your group to form a pair. In each pair, one participant is randomly chosen to be the sender,
and one to be the receiver. Remember that this process is random and the assignment
changes every round. So, you will not know whom you are playing with.
Each round, after pairs have been formed and roles have been assigned, the computer selects
one of the following two payoff tables. Final payoffs for both participants will essentially be
determined according to the selected table and the action U or D to be taken later on by the
receiver.
Table A Sender Receiver
Action U 5 1
Action D 1 5
Table B Sender Receiver
Action U 1 5
Action D 5 1
Sender’s Instructions.
At the beginning of the round only the sender will be informed about the actual payoff table
chosen by the computer. The sender is the first one to take a decision in the game. She/He
has to select one of the following three options:
• Communicate to the receiver that table A represents payoffs.
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• Communicate to the receiver that table B represents payoffs.
• Do not send any message to the receiver and pay a cost of 0.5 points.
The computer screen for the sender is as follows:
The two tables at the top of the screen represent payoffs according to the tables A and B.
Below you find the information whether table A or table B was chosen by the computer. In
our example it is table A. Additionally, you find three buttons labelled A, B and Do not
send any message. By clicking on the buttons A or B you inform the receiver that you have
observed the corresponding table. If you click on the button Do not send any message
the receiver does not get any message and the sender has to pay a cost of 0.5 points. Please,
take into account that the sender can select any option s/he wants.
The sender has 20 seconds to take this decision.
This is the only decision the sender has to make in this game.
Receiver’s Instructions.
Once the receiver observes the message of the sender s/he is matched with, the receiver has
to select between action U and D. The corresponding computer screen is as it can be seen
on the top of the next page:
The two tables in the top of the screen represent payoffs according to the tables A and B.
Below you find the decision of the sender. In our example the sender paid a cost of 0.5 points
and did not send any message. On the right hand side, there are two buttons labelled U and
D. By clicking on the buttons you take the corresponding actions.
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The receiver has 20 seconds to take this decision. Once this action is taken, a new screen
appears summarizing the outcome of the round so far.
In the computer screen above you see that (a) the actual payoff table is represented by table
A, (b) the sender did not sent any message and (c) the receiver took action D. As a result,
the potential payoff of the sender and the receiver is 0.5 points and 5 points, respectively.
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Now, the receiver is asked to take a final decision: She/He must either accept the current
payoff distribution or reduce the payoff of both participants to zero. By clicking on the button
Yes, the receiver reduces the payoffs of both participants. If you click on the buttonNo, then
the current payoff distribution is accepted. The receiver has 20 seconds to take this decision.
Summary of the Round.
The final screen is a summary of the round: It indicates the actual payoff table, the decisions
of both the sender and the receiver, and the earnings of both participants in this round.
Additionally, you are also informed about your total payoff up to this period.
The screen above is the sender’s summary. It indicates that payoffs are represented by table
A and that the sender did not sent any message. Moreover, since the receiver took action
D and did not reduce payoffs, the sender gets 0.5 points and the receiver gets 5 points. At
the end of a round, click on the button Continue.
Payment.
The points you accumulate during the course of the session will determine your payment.
The exchange rate Points/Euros is such that every 15 points in the experiment are equal to 1
Euro; that is, if you total payoff after 50 rounds is equal to 165 points, then you get 11 Euros
for your participation in this experiment.
Once the experiment has finished and you have answered the computerized questionnaire take
the official receipt to the counter. Your personal data will be kept confidential and will be
used only for statistical purposes. Please, do not fill in your final payment into the
official receipt. This will be done by us!!! Once you are paid, you may leave.
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Z-Tree Programs and Raw Data
Both the z-Tree programs and the raw data can be downloaded from the following website:
http://www.personeel.unimaas.nl/m.vorsatz/
The z-Tree programs (finallieaversion1.ztt for the Benchmark Game and finallieaver-
sion2.ztt for the Punishment Game) are ready to be implemented. However, if some question
remains, please feel free to contact one of the authors. The raw data consists of ten Excel
files. They are named in the following way: c-treatment-session#.xls. The variables follow
also a rather straightforward denomination.
1. Global Variables
• NumPeriods (number of repetitions)
• nature (1=table A, 2=table B)
• c (cost of remaining silent)
• ratio (the higher of the two possible payoffs)
2. Subject Variables
• player1 (1=message A, 2=message B, 3=remain silent, 0=subject was a receiver)
• player2 (1=action U, 2=action D, 0=subject was a sender)
• reduce (1=punish, 2=accept payoffs, 0=subject was a sender)
• The variables Player1, Player2, and Reduce are equal to the actions taken by the
participant the considered subject is matched with.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the subjects 1 to 6 form one independent observation
and the subjects 7 to 12 another.
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